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SUMMARY
The gold standard was a system of fixed exchange rates that offered little opportunity for
carrying out monetary policies, short of suspending gold convertibility. Trade integration and
capital mobility were very high. It is worthwhile asking whether there are useful lessons to
draw for EMU from European experience during that period. One clear lesson is that debts
matter. Another basic finding is that the stability of the European gold standard depended on
the underlying price trend. Deflation prior to 1895 resulted in rising public debt burdens,
which forced some countries to leave the system. Once gold was discovered and deflation
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3gave way to inflation, real interest service fell, debts grew more slowly and a high degree of
convergence allowed most countries to return to gold. For EMU, this result implies that
stability will hinge on the ECB’s policy not being too restrictive. Other lessons concern the
fragility of institutions in the face of deep public finance difficulties, the risks for the single
market of leaving out countries that have not fully converged, and the existence of a virtuous
cycle including low real interest rates, fast growth and debt deccumulation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the early years of the Industrial Revolution, European countries have, collectively or
separately, tried various economic arrangements. These efforts include insulation: commercial
protectionism until the Cobden–Chevalier Treaty of 1860, capital controls from the 1930s to
the 1970s, and the free float of the 1930s. They also include periods of openness: fixed
exchange rates with the ERM, free capital mobility during the nineteenth century, and
increased free trade since the Treaty of Rome. The latest step,  European monetary unification,
stands as an unparalleled experiment. Or does it? In a sense, it doesn’t.
On the eve of the First World War, such heterogeneous countries as wealthy Britain, France
and Germany, small open Belgium and Netherlands, the Scandinavian nations, uneven Italy
with its leading industrial north and underdeveloped south, backward and agricultural Greece,
and even catching-up Russia, all found themselves on a common gold standard with essentially
free capital and labour mobility as well as low levels of commercial protection. These
5countries, which hardly formed an optimum currency area, had undergone a common process
of institutional reform that resulted in central banks’ statutes being designed to foster
institutional independence from governmental interference. Some contemporaries even dreamt
of a common central bank – although we know the rest of the story.
The relevance of the European side of the gold standard for current debates remains to
be fully grasped (Foreman-Peck (1991) is a contribution). In sharp contrast to the current
strategy of convergence, which  proceeds along agreed common rules (the Maastricht Treaty,
the Stability and Growth Pact), the spread of the gold standard to Europe was a highly
decentralized process. It  was triggered by a lack of  co-operation between France and
Germany, which led in the early 1870s to the demise of silver and bimetallic standards in
western, central, and eastern Europe (Flandreau, 1995a, 1996). Decentralization was again
visible as various European countries hopped on and off gold convertibility in the period
between 1880 and 1914 (Eichengreen and Flandreau, 1996). The many international monetary
conferences that took place between 1865 and 1892 called for extensive policy co-ordination,
but they failed to achieve very much, if anything (Russell, 1898; Gallarotti, 1995). Yet most of
Europe ended up on gold, without collectively agreed targets for debt, deficits, inflation,
exchange rates or long-run interest rates. To the extent that it succeeded, the European gold
standard appears as a case of stability without a pact.
Is it true to say that policy-makers of the time harboured a benign view of monetary
policy and public finance? Quite to the contrary, the economic literature of the time shows that
contemporaries did worry about the level of public debts, deficits, etc., which were very much
at the heart of  policy debates (see, e.g., Baxter, 1871). Moreover, the statistical apparatus to
assess monetary and fiscal policy was readily available, so the absence of formal criteria cannot
be explained by ‘technological’ limitations. Acceptable measures of activity would start to be
constructed only in the years preceding the First World War, but several substitutes existed.
General surveys were frequently conducted, and various industrial indices were used to assess
6the economic situation, providing contemporaries with a fair notion of national income. They
also had very precise figures on exports and population, and often computed ratios of public
debts or flows of interest payment per head in an attempt to compare national debt burdens in
a more systematic manner (see, e.g., Théry, 1887). Another view is that the gold standard
acted as a kind of invisible (to modern economists) hand, which provided a number of implicit
mechanisms that substituted for our modern formal criteria. This traditional interpretation,
which dates back to the interwar years, sees the classical gold standard as a coherent system of
rules and policies. (For critiques of this view, see Bloomfield (1959) and Triffin (1964); for
links with current debates in Europe, see Eichengreen and Flandreau (1997).) Recent work has
refined this interpretation by specifying the nature of restraints.
A first view emphasizes the political mechanism. Gallarotti (1995) stresses that the ruling
European bourgeoisie wanted stable prices and exchange rates over the long run, because it
held a large fraction of its wealth and pensions in the shape of fixed-interest domestic and
foreign bonds. The conservative policies that preserved the gold standard are seen as the by-
product of the conservatism of élites. However, in a democratic society, decision making must
be transparent and consensual. Monetary stability cannot rest on an arrangement that
empowers a specific interest group with the ability to set fiscal or monetary targets. Formal
rules are needed to prevent changes in political majorities resulting in fiscal misconduct. The
Maastricht « formal rules » approach would be a democratic equivalent of the Gold Standard
« political » mechanism.
An alternative view emphasizes the market mechanism. According to Bordo and Rockoff
(1996), the gold standard rule worked as an incentive mechanism. Lenders monitored fiscal
and monetary misconduct, using gold convertibility as a signal of orthodox policies. Because
leaving the gold standard implied higher interest rates, each country had an incentive to adopt
disciplined policies. Bordo and Rockoff’s point is that this mechanism was stabilizing because
disciplined countries were rewarded through lower interest rates: ‘countries chose to join the
7gold standard bloc, even though being on gold imposed restraint on their fiscal and monetary
behaviour’.2 However, nothing in this reasoning is specific to the gold standard. The same
incentives should in principle exist under any r gime: indeed, the modern literature on
financial markets discipline (Bishop et al., 1989) stresses that markets  perform the job of
providing governments with appropriate incentives. Under this view, therefore, the market
mechanism will be an essential ingredient of stability in the Euro zone.
The institutional and market mechanism views of the gold standard correspond to two
alternative perceptions of the requisites for a successful functioning of the Euro zone. This
paper looks into the historical precedent of the gold standard to determine whether lessons can
be drawn for today's Europe. We begin with an investigation of the record of the European
gold standard (section 2). Our key conclusion is that the gold standard comprised two
subperiods. The first period, starting in 1880, ended with a severe exchange crisis in the 1890s.
The second period began with exchange rate instability, but then evolved after the turn of the
century towards the stable European gold standard. We also find that exchange rate instability
coincided in an intriguing way with the record of European debt/GDP ratios.
Section 3 looks at the role of institutional design. Focusing on the record of central
bank independence, we find that monetary authorities did not always enjoy the respect and awe
that has been portrayed in the literature. Central bank independence was constantly tested, and
repeatedly violated, especially when recurrent fiscal difficulties were experienced. It was only
after 1896 that central bank independence was gradually reconstructed, suggesting that the
degree of insulation of monetary authorities is not exogenous.
Section 4 evaluates the market discipline hypothesis. We contribute to the literature
(see Mélitz, 1997) by adding to studies that have looked at existing monetary unions (see, e.g.,
Bayoumi et al., 1995) a situation where European debt burdens were found at levels that are
close to current ones.
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8Section 5 looks at price movements that affected the opportunity cost of being part of
the gold standard. When prices were falling, debt service costs rose and many debt-laden
countries suspended gold convertibility. By contrast, countries found it easier to participate in
the gold standard when prices rose. To a large extent, divergence and convergence within the
gold area can be traced to trends in rates of inflation.
The conclusion sums up the evidence and discusses policy implications. In particular,
we suggest that stability will hinge on the ECB’s policy not being too restrictive.
2. LIVING WITH HIGH DEBTS: STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT THE EUROPEAN
GOLD STANDARD
2.1. European integration and globalization, 1880–1914
While this paper focuses on Europe as a regional entity, it should be kept in mind that the
European gold standard developed in the context of global integration, both real and nominal,
and was one aspect of the international gold standard. Capital, as is often the case, was perhaps
the most mobile factor and flowed swiftly across borders. Numerous empirical studies have
demonstrated that extremely close links existed between regional financial centres in Europe
and elsewhere. Short-term capital, in the shape of exchange bills, circulated rapidly from
country to country, and short-term interest rates exhibited considerable covariations at both the
European (Flandreau, 1995b) and international levels (Zevin, 1992), even during financial
crises. Goschen, a contemporary observer, called it the ‘solidarity of international financial
centres’. Long-term capital also travelled rapidly. Large and well-organized capital markets
(the leading centres had a capitalization that represented several times the national product of
the corresponding country) provided borrowers with a huge pool of funds on which they could
9tap. Private and public issues took place in co-ordination with banking syndicates that provided
underwriting facilities, and became an important outlet for individual savings. As a result,
national investment was not limited by domestic resources, thus giving rise to a disconnection
between saving and investment. When implementing Feldstein–Horioka’s test of the saving-
investment correlation, Bayoumi (1990) and Taylor (1996) found recently that the period
1880–1914 was one of greater disconnection between saving and investment than any
subsequent period. These findings are hardly surprising in view of the limited obstacles to
financial flows. Even if some governments reportedly attempted to manipulate financial
markets for political reasons, they were countered by the competition between lending centres,
mostly London, Paris and Berlin. Minor price differences remaining between identical assets
traded in different markets were generally traceable to differences in tax systems or other
minor frictional costs.
Labour mobility was high too. European immigration laws were usually not very
restrictive, and some intra-European mobility existed. Such migrations, however, remained
either local (workers crossing the border on a daily basis) or seasonal. These movements were
in any case dwarfed by the massive flows of migrants between the old and the new worlds, a
factor which, according to Williamson (1996), contributed to the convergence of real wages.
Migrants leaving Italy, Germany or Scandinavia helped to relieve the downward pressure on
the regions where European wages were lowest.
While capital and to a certain extent labour markets were largely globalized, markets
for commodities had a regional bias. European trade was based on short distances, similarities
in tastes (Verley, 1997) and generally low levels of protection. The proportion of trade coming
from and going to European countries as a share of total European trade generally stood above
50%, in some periods, even above 60%. Bairoch (1974) notes, however, that European trade
became slightly less Eurocentred as it  progressed. Rising incomes were accompanied by an
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increased demand for greater variety in imports, and this trend was accentuated by the decline
of transportation costs over the period 1870–1914.
Like today, globalization aroused fears of economic decline, especially after the 1890s.
For instance, economist Théry warned that ‘emerging countries, newcomers to modern
civilization, equipped thanks to the investments of Old Europe, organized by [its] engineers
and industrialists, having lands of an incomparable fertility and an almost free labour force,
exempt from unions and strikes, [were] on their way to the economic conquest of the world’
(Théry, 1894). Contrary to the current situation, the European response to these challenges
was not the deepening of the European market, but rather some partial sheltering of domestic
economies behind protective barriers. The movement towards extended free trade that had
developed after 1860 stalled in 1879, and started receding in the 1890s. According to Bairoch
(1993), the period after 1892 should thus be portrayed as one of gradually rising protectionism
in continental Europe. Yet indices of protection before the First World War reveal that Europe
was no fortress. Measured as a ratio between customs revenues and imports, protection rates
were about 8% for Europe at large and 10% for the continent alone (Bairoch, 1993). This was
less protectionnist than, say, the USA, Canada or Australia.
2.2. Gold parities and exchange rates: entry, exit and the spread of the gold standard
Participation in the gold club was not the outcome of any negotiation. A country only needed
to define a gold parity for its currency: that is, the quantity of pure gold in national coins. As
long as they effectively maintained convertibility (i.e., stood ready to exchange their notes
against coins), central banks indirectly pegged their bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis other
gold convertible currencies within the so-called gold points. These may be thought of as target
zones, whose centre coincided with the official parity and whose bandwidth corresponded
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approximately to bullion shipping charges between countries. This was the situation in
countries like Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Other currencies, while not
strictly convertible, behaved as if they were pegged to gold, because the central bank held
foreign exchange reserves and used them to stabilize the exchange rate each time it threatened
to exit notional gold points. This was the case in Austria. In other countries, such as Greece in
the years immediately preceding the First World War, the national currency was related to gold
through what was essentially a currency board arrangement: domestic units were created on a
one-for-one basis as a counterpart of foreign exchange reserve holdings.
Since these measures were implemented at the country’s convenience, they could always be
suspended without international agreement: the option was always available to suspend
convertibility, discontinue stabilizing foreign exchange interventions, or quit gold standard
arrangements. In this case, the country was effectively dropping off gold and its exchange rate
could fluctuate. Historically, such decisions tended to follow periods of crisis, during which
money creation had been large and capital inflows low, so that the amount of gold (or
reserves) required to settle the country’s external obligations was larger than the quantity
available in the vaults of the central bank. Once off gold, countries found themselves effectively
on a paper standard with a floating exchange rate. The official gold parity represented a floor
for exchange rate appreciation, because the central bank that could not sell gold against notes
could still sell notes against gold. A country could either undertake to return the exchange rate
to its gold parity (a course adopted during the period under study by Portugal, Greece, Italy
and Spain), or bring the parity into line with exchange depreciation, accepting a permanent
devaluation (a course adopted by Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 1890s).
Figure 1 summarizes the spread of the gold standard in Europe. There is, of course, a
degree of arbitrariness in deciding where to put the boundary between shadowing a gold
standard and not being on a gold standard, but the general pattern would survive alternative
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definitions. This figure reveals a dichotomy between a European ‘core’ comprising Britain,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Scandinavia, and the European southern and
eastern ‘peripheries’. In the core, the gold standard was a durable regime of unquestioned
exchange rate stability. However, in the periphery, adherence to the gold standard was less
robust.3 Traditional descriptions of the evolution of the gold standard tend to characterize it as
a continuous process of extension. More careful scrutiny reveals two periods. The first phase,
from 1880 to the mid-1890s, witnessed increasing fragility with fewer countries on gold at the
end of the period than at the beginning. Only during the second phase did the gold standard
generalize to the periphery of Europe, still leaving aside Spain and Portugal. The era of
monetary stability in Europe was in fact circumscribed to the ten years immediately preceding
the First World War.
Figure 2 displays the evolution of European exchange rates in terms of end-of-period
gold parity, so that a value above unity means the exchange rate is temporarily depreciated.
The three key European currencies (sterling, franc and reichsmark) are excluded from the
diagram because they remained within their assigned gold points throughout the period. The
general pattern exhibits a bell shape. Nearly all exchange rates are located in a narrow 10%
interval. The only exception is Portugal, for which the depreciation was around 20%. For
several countries, depreciation was considerable during the 1890s and early 1900s, and was
followed by appreciation as the currencies return to the gold standard.
The general pattern conceals three different groups. Small economies, such as Belgium,
the Netherlands and Scandinavia, display a very high level of exchange rate stability throughout
the period. The second group comprises the central and eastern European empires (Russia and
Austria-Hungary). While the exchange rate depreciation that had characterized these countries
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until the mid-1880s had come to a halt, their currencies still fluctuated wildly at short
frequency (Yeager, 1969). In the early 1890s, the rouble and the florin eventually stabilized
around a new, devalued gold parity, which acknowledged the depreciation that had occurred
since the 1870s. In both cases no effort was made to go back to the mid-century gold parity,
and the devaluation was substantial (about 30% in the case of Russia). The third group
comprises the southern European countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and to a lesser extent,
Italy). For these countries, depreciation began and accelerated after 1890, reaching
considerable levels (about 80% for Greece in 1895, above 65% for Spain and Portugal in
1898). In the early 1900s, however, their exchange rates stabilized and then regained lost
ground. Only Greece and Italy went back to gold, but Spain and to a lesser extent Portugal
experienced a substantial stabilization of their currencies in terms of gold.
Thus the European gold standard was not the strict regime often portrayed in the
literature; or if it was, then its  rules were repeatedly broken. Moreover, once the rules were
broken, there was no reason to expect a quick return to the old parity, as exemplified by Russia
and Austria-Hungary. A more adequate picture of the gold standard comprises a stable core
with southern and eastern peripheries – an intriguing reminder of  today’s divisions.
2.3. Long-term interest rates
The long-term interest rates shown in Figure 3 were computed as the implicit return on
government-funded long-term debt. The corresponding bonds typically bore gold coupons and
thus provide us with a measure of the various governments’ default risk, because such
instruments were not subject to exchange rate depreciation (technically, paying the coupon in
paper rather than in gold would amount to a partial default). The diagram shows that interest
rates converged only between 1905 and 1913. Among the core countries, convergence was
achieved as early as 1880, and was sustained throughout the period, although some narrowing
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of the range is perceptible in the final years. The other countries faced much higher rates, but
they all tended to converge towards the core countries until the late 1880s. Then a split
occurred. While central and eastern European countries (Russia and Austria-Hungary)
converged further, southern Europe exhibited an opposite trend.
During the 1890s, 1900s and early 1910s, the spread between central and eastern
Europe and the European core continued to decline, only interrupted by the Russo-Japanese
war, which caused a relatively mild upsurge in Russian rates. In contrast, in the early 1890s,
interest rates in Portugal, Greece and Spain, and to much more modest extent Italy, bounced
up.4 A steady decline came later, after the turn of the century: to the Reich’s disappointment,
Italy’s long-run interest rate even fell below that of Germany.
2.4. Debt/GDP ratios
The ratios of total debt to gross domestic product are shown in Figure 4. We can observe
considerable differences across countries, with ratios ranging from 200% (Greece, 1890) to
3% (Switzerland throughout the period).5 At the beginning of the period, large debtors (in
terms of national income) included Spain (160%) which defaulted in 1881–2, Italy and France
(around 95%), Portugal, the Netherlands and Austria-Hungary (75%). Greece and Russia, for
which debt/GDP ratios can be computed only after 1885, also entered the scene with ratios
around 75%. Thus, more countries were found above a hypothetical 60% threshold, where the
UK roughly lay, than below it: only Germany and some small countries (Belgium, Scandinavia
and Switzerland) were found substantially below that level.
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figures we report are inclusive of all regional debts.
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Pre-First World War levels tended to be slightly lower. With the exception of Spain and
Italy (around 100%), France and Greece (at about 80%) and Portugal (120%), debt/GDP
ratios were below 60%. Yet, some initially low-debt countries (such as Germany and Belgium)
had experienced a mild increase in their ratio, so that intra-European differences were smaller
than they had been in the past. This evolution, far from continuous, conceals a general trend of
initially increasing and then declining ratios (the exception being Britain, where the decline was
steady). The coincidence between this movement and the post-1900 process of long-term
interest rate convergence observed in Figure 3 is striking. It suggests that long-term interest
rates are a broad measure of default risk. This pattern contradicts the received wisdom – based
on the American and British experiences – according to which public debts rose in periods of
war and declined in periods of peace. With peace prevailing during the period, military shocks
were relatively few. Even when wars occurred and led to debt accumulation, the broad trends
were not reversed, as can be seen from the case of Russia during its war against Japan, or of
Greece at the time of the Balkan crises after 1900. Conversely, debts rose before domestic or
external unrest, as exemplified by Spain and Portugal until the mid-1890s. The rise of
continental debts in the midst of the pax britannica suggests that current European concerns
with high debts in fact have very old precedents.
Summarizing, we find that during the period of the gold standard, European countries
went through a largely common trend of rising and then declining debts. This process was
accompanied by co-movements in long-term interest rates and exchange rates. The heyday of
the gold standard was in fact circumscribed to the years between 1900 and 1913, when spreads
between exchange rates, interest rates and debt/GDP ratios were decreasing. It does not cover
the whole period between 1880 and 1913, as is often assumed. As we reconsider the overall
experience, we seek to determine the common causes of varied experiences, in contrast to the
traditional focus on the common causes of an alleged common success.
16
3. INSTITUTIONAL FIXES: DEMOCRACY, CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
AND THE SPREAD OF THE EUROPEAN GOLD STANDARD
In this section, we document the contribution of institutional arrangements to monetary
stability under the European gold standard. Our goal is to try to assess the extent to which the
features documented above can be ascribed to institutions.
3.1. Politics and institutions: the gold standard record
As shiny as gold may be, it cannot be used to stabilize debts that have been monetized. Fiscal
misbehaviour inevitably leads to a gradual depletion of gold reserves, usually accompanied by a
speculative attack and exchange depreciation (Flood and Garber, 1984). What matters is the
decision-making process within the gold standard, hence the importance of relations between
monetary authorities and the polity. It is often believed that, before 1914, monetary authorities
remained largely insulated from politics and were able to commit themselves credibly to the
maintenance of stable exchange rates. This claim (which can be traced back to Polanyi (1944))
has taken a variety of forms. Some authors have argued that the pre-1914 period was one of
universal central bank independence. For instance, Capie et al. (1994) have argued that
monetary laissez-faire (by which they meant limited government intervention) emerged in the
nineteenth century and dominated throughout the years 1880–1914, until it was repealed
during the war. Under this view, most analyses tend to focus on the relationship between
central and commercial banks (see, e.g., Goodhart, 1988). Very few recent studies document
the long swings in central bank independence (partial exceptions include Holtfrerich (1988)
and Bouvier (1988), who briefly discuss the pre-1914 period for Germany and France; Capie et
al. (1994) also discuss the issue briefly, and it is dealt with more extensively in Capie (1997)).
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The modern prejudice is that central banks were de facto in the hands of the financial
establishment, which thus implemented its preferred policies independently of what the public
felt (Gallarotti, 1995). Eichengreen (1992, 1996) further suggests that the restrictive electoral
franchise, the limited strength of trade unionism and the dearth of parliamentary labour parties
helped to reduce distributional conflicts because those who were in charge of monetary policy
were those who suffered least from its effects. Painful adjustments that resulted in wage
contraction were always feasible, since workers did not have a say. Table 1 reports estimates
of the registered electorate as a proportion of the enfranchised age group (see Flora et al.
(1983) for a discussion of the methodological problems involved in this measurement).6 Th
extension of the franchise in the latter part of the nineteenth century corresponds to the gradual
elimination of exclusions based on income as well as reductions in the list of requirements. By
the turn of the century, remaining exclusions for men included the homeless, convicts, those
with criminal records or in asylums, and those who had recently changed residence; for them,
and for women, democracy would have to wait. But workers were in general no longer
excluded.
Table 1 does not suggest a direct link between limitations on democracy and the
stability of the gold standard. In fact, the trend towards extended franchise coincides after
1900 with the decline in debt/GDP ratios. For instance, in Italy, universal suffrage was granted
only in the early years of the twentieth century, after the lira was firmly stabilized, and it did
not weaken the lira. It is during these years that the yield on Italian bonds fell below the
German level. Similarly, exchange rate instability in Austria coincided with a restricted
                                         
6 The figures are (politically incorrectly) constructed on the basis of the male population only, since such was
the way universality of voting rights was understood at that time. From the point of view of our argument this
restriction matters only if potential female voters would have systematically favoured less conservative interests.
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franchise, while stability again coincided with an extended franchise. Conversely, core
countries such as Germany and France had granted universal and equal suffrage well before the
period under study (in 1871 and 1848 respectively). Many authors may have been influenced
by the case of Britain, where a restricted franchise did indeed coincide with monetary stability.
But on this dimension, when all of  Europe is taken into account, Britain stands as an
exception.
3.2. Central bank independence, 1880–1914: doctrines and features
No view could be more distant from the concerns of economists in the 1890s and 1900s than
the modern prejudice that central bank independence was the normal state of affairs during the
gold standard. In the years immediately preceding the First World War, the protection of
central banks against political pressures was indeed high. However, this was perceived by
contemporaries as being the result of a patient construct which, in a large number of European
nations, had only recently been completed. Summarizing in 1911 a view that had developed in
the profession over the past half century, leading monetary expert Raphaël-Georges Lévy
refers to the ‘theory that calls for the separation of the central bank from the State’ (Lévy,
1911). This theory has a surprisingly familiar ring: according to Lévy, central bank
independence was an absolute prerequisite for exchange rate stability, because a non-
independent bank would lead market participants to expect eventual debt monetization. As a
result, central banks or banks of issue served public treasuries better if their ‘existence [is]
more independent, and their administration more separate, from that of the State. The less
public authority gets involved into the management of the banking system, the better national
                                                                                                                          
Yet as Scandinavian socialists would learn to their expense in the 1900s, women’s right to vote often resulted,
in the short run, in more conservative outcomes, not more leftist ones.
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credit and wealth are protected.’ On the eve of the First World War, Lévy wrote approvingly
of the progress of central bank independence.
Central banks initially developed as the interface between the banking and industrial
communities and the state. On the one hand, the banking and industrial communities needed a
central bank to implement some minimum level of co-ordination among financial institutions,
most importantly to provide lender of last resort functions in periods of crisis. For this purpose,
co-operation of state bodies was necessary, as special laws and decrees had to be passed. On
the other hand, the state wanted easy access to credit, as well as influence over monetary
policy: for instance, favouring certain groups or making credit more abundant in a proto-
Keynesian way (as argued by Kindleberger (1988), public works and fiscal stimuli were not an
invention of the 1930s). States and banking or industrial communities had thus both common
and divergent interests, and central banks’ charters were the locus where the balance of power
both crystallized and could be renegotiated.
Governments could extract seigniorage in two ways. They could force the central bank to
monetize the debt and they could directly circulate government notes independently of the
central bank. Following Cukierman’s (1992) distinction between limitations on lending and
ways to influence decisions, two features of central banks’ charters are of interest. Direct
political control is  linked to the ownership of the bank (privately or state owned), the
appointment of the board (governor, sub-governor(s) and council), as well as rules governing
the cover system. Obviously, the greater the private sector ingredient in the decision-making
process, the more constrained was the government (Capie (1997) makes a similar point).
Indirect control rests on rules governing the government's right to obtain short-term advances,
to monetize securities, or to issue its own paper. One should not take a nominalist view of such
features. Statutes were not resources lying exclusively in the hands of central bankers or
governments. They were the endogenous outcome of negotiations that codified state–bank
relations when charters were drafted, and their adjustment over time followed, rather than
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preceded, actual changes in underlying power relations. Leads and lags existed between printed
norms and actual behaviour. For instance, the central bank’s need to obtain on occasions a
renewal of its charter, especially in the presence of a potential competitor, reduced its actual
bargaining power well b ow what statutes suggested, especially as the renegotiation of the
charter approached. Moreover, ‘invisible’ threats could very well distort actual practices. On
the other hand, the need for the government to secure a minimum level of co-operation from
the banking community (for instance, when large public loans were floated) certainly checked
its incentive to exploit the bank of issue.7
3.3. The good guys
Table 2 summarizes the information for the three core countries (Britain, France and Germany)
and Table 3 focuses on smaller economies (Belgium, the Netherlands and Scandinavia). For
these eight countries, which were steady members of the gold club, we find substantial
balances in the relationship between government and the central bank. Statutory limits usually
applied to automatic credit lines, which were kept to minimum, when they existed. Issues
backed by government securities were tightly regulated. Additional requirements pertained to
the cover system. Taken together, these measures made sure that the bank would always have
enough free resources to invest in private bills (as opposed to government paper), while
providing for an appropriate cover ratio. These protections were often further supported by the
balance of power on the board. Because the central bank was often a private corporation, it
had to include some representation of the shareholders. Interestingly, in Sweden, the only
country in this group where it was state owned, the central bank was explicitly made
                                         
7 Posen (1994) supports the endogeneity view largely held among economic historians Alesina (1994) presents
the mainstream economists’ counterview.
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responsible not to the Treasury but to Parliament, to which it had to report. In all eight
countries, parliamentary audits of central bank action and accounts generalized over time.
This broad pattern, however, conceals national idiosyncrasies. Britain, the Netherlands,
Belgium and the Scandinavian countries had the most independent central banks. All combined
a fair amount of independence in the decision-making process with statutory requirements
regarding their cover system, advances to the state, and issues on the basis of government
securities. In France, however, almost no formal rule existed regarding either the cover system
or limitations on government credit. Since parallel issues were not authorized, reserve ratios
and investment in public securities depended on the balance of power on the bank’s board (the
Conseil Général).  The independence of the Bank of France thus rested on the ability of
shareholders to impose their decisions during board meetings. They were indeed able to
outvote government officials,  but the checks and balances that prevailed in some other
countries was lacking.8  Ironically perhaps, Germany had the least independent central bank of
the group. Large powers rested in the hands of the Chancellor of the Empire, who effectively
directed the bank through a technocrat. The shareholders’ role was limited to auditing and
certifying the bank’s accounts. Their delegates could participate in board meetings, but their
votes were not taken into account. Most checks rested on the set of formal rules governing
note issues (see James (1997) for a congruent view). Much of the discipline was exercised
through the cover system, which put a lower limit on the specie reserve. The fact that the
Chancellor needed shareholders’ support from time to time (for instance, when the capital of
the bank had to be increased) also fostered compliance to these agreed rules.
                                         
8 The absence of formal constraints left more space for bargaining. This has led historians of the relations
between the Bank of France and the state (Bouvier, 1988; Plessis, 1985) to conclude that the bank was not very
independent. That the Bank of France was able to implement deflationary policies when needed, and even when
this did not suit the government, is in our view the proof of its effective autonomy.
22
3.4. Central bank independence in the European periphery
3.4.1. Central–eastern Europe. In eastern and central Europe, State–bank relations changed
over time and differed from those prevailing in core countries (Table 4). In Russia the bank
was owned and controlled by the state. The cover system, initially modelled on the British
system, nominally imposed tight limits on the issue of banknotes. These limitations quickly lost
significance as the Treasury started to circulate its own notes. Moreover, while issues based on
government bonds were limited, short-term advances to the state were unlimited. Several
schemes were tried as the rouble depreciated in the 1870s and fluctuated in the 1880s, but
reform had to await the final consolidation of Russian finances in the early 1890s. While the
central bank remained under state control, a number of decrees provided for strict limits on
note issues by the government. The Russian Treasury borrowed on international markets to
purchase the bank’s gold reserve. In 1897 the system took its final shape with a regime that
provided for one of the highest cover ratios on the continent, and ruled out parallel issues.
Contemporaries were generally impressed. For instance, Conant (1915) concluded that ‘the
history of the Bank of Russia is of interest, because it is the most successful instance on a large
scale of a bank of issue owned by the State, and because it carried through in the closing
decade of the nineteenth century the most serious operations ever undertaken in Europe for the
restoration of stability of exchange upon a gold basis’. Of course, this policy could be reversed
in a matter of days by a few decrees. The Bank of Russia’s independence was credible only
inasmuch as nobody expected the Treasury to change its policy stance.
The Austro-Hungarian case reveals some similarities. Until the late 1870s, the central
bank was the Bank of Austria. While private, it operated under the control of the Austrian
Treasury, which could obtain short-term advances and force the bank to take up its securities.
As in Russia, the Treasury could short-circuit the bank and issue government notes: in 1877
these issues had reached 350 million florins at a time when central bank note issues totalled
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about 300 million. This situation created considerable uncertainty and the exchange rate
fluctuated widely. In 1878 the statutes of the Austrian central bank were redrafted. Under
pressure from Hungary, the central bank, renamed the Austro-Hungarian Bank, came under
joint control of both Austria and Hungary. This situation was further consolidated in 1887 with
the introduction of a combined system of fractional reserve and minimum cover ratio, which
provided tight limits on direct government seigniorage. In 1892 a set of monetary laws laid the
foundations for the adoption of the gold standard. The outstanding government paper money
would have to be repurchased gradually, and the Treasury would no longer be allowed to issue
notes. Statutory advances were kept to a minimum and government bonds were not allowed to
be part of the reserve. The Austro-Hungarian Bank was gradually converging towards western
European standards.
3.4.2. Southern European countries. Southern European countries provide a graphic
illustration of how easily independence can be suspended in the face of serious fiscal
difficulties. Treasuries in the four southern European countries usually refrained from directly
issuing notes. They preferred to use statutory advances and automatic credit on government
bonds. While initially limited, these facilities were gradually extended during the second half of
the 1880s. For instance, in 1887 both Portugal and Greece loosened the constraints on short-
term advances. The process accelerated in the early 1890s. The Spanish government decided
that the bills issued to finance the Treasury’s overseas expenses would be discounted by the
Bank of Spain, which was further forced in 1891 to grant a large credit to the state. In
Portugal, Greece and Italy, short-term advances were made to the Treasury in exchange for the
deposit of government bonds, sometimes almost at will. Limits on note issue were repeatedly
raised.
Italy was the first country to take decisive remedial steps. In 1893 it imposed tight
limits on government credit and added a 40% cover system to its central bank. Greece
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followed suit in 1898 after the international rescue package, put together to help Greece pay its
indemnity to Turkey, led to a shift in the balance of power between the bank (which had in the
past unsuccessfully sought to resist government intervention) and the Treasury. Now under
close creditor control, the Treasury’s ability to pressurize the central bank was substantially
reduced. Additional automatic advances were ruled out in 1899 and, finally, investment in
public securities was kept to a statutory maximum.
In Spain, reform started under the Villaverde ministry, at the turn of the century. In
1902 it was decided that short-term advances to the Treasury should be gradually reimbursed.
While investment in public securities was still unlimited, the Treasury made a substantial effort
to consolidate its balance sheet and repurchase the former advances, and this in turn succeeded
in consolidating the bank’s reserves. The proportion of specie in the reserves grew at the
expense of government bonds. In Portugal, efforts at separating the central bank from the state
remained elusive. Until the end of the period, the Portuguese Treasury continued to draw on
the Bank of Portugal by depositing depreciating government securities in exchange for short-
term credit. This easy door to monetization was never shut, and the political turmoil of the last
years before the war led to a return to automatic central bank credit and exchange rate
fragility. On the eve of the First World War, Portugal had the least independent central bank
and was not in sight of the gold standard.
3.5. Conclusion
It is clearly impossible to claim that central bank independence was the European gold
standard’s recipe for monetary stability. Rather, poor exchange rate performance was
associated with low levels of central bank independence. Much like today, contemporary
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observers concluded that central bank independence was the exogenous source of stability. Yet
the evidence suggests that institutions were extremely fragile and never resisted the pull of
fiscal problems. The evolution of Southern European central banks’ statutes in the 1890s
demonstrates that the protective walls that appeared so safe in core countries could very well
crumble. Eventual efforts towards better protection of monetary authorities were in fact led by
governments (Raffalovich, 1900). Central bank independence thus came and went as fiscal
needs changed. Public finance problems led to the collapse of Mediterranean currencies in the
1890s, and their resolution led the way out. The consolidations in Italy, Spain and Greece had
not been imposed on the Treasury by a powerful central bank. Rather, the increased autonomy
of the central bank resulted from the Treasury’s ability to balance its accounts. In Russia and
Austria, treasuries even provided the central bank with a critical mass of gold reserves. In the
next section, therefore, we consider how constraints on debt accumulation might have
influenced both exchange rate stability and central bank autonomy.
4. IN SEARCH OF THE MARKET MECHANISM
4.1. Market discipline: the weak, the strong and the ugly
According to the market discipline hypothesis, lenders charge higher interest rates to
borrowers whom they consider riskier, which in turn discourages risky behaviour. The
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question, of course, is to determine what defines risky behaviour. Bordo and Rockoff (1996)
ask whether adherence to the gold standard was the signal that markets used to judge
countries. They find that long-term interest rates are indeed statistically lower in countries on
the gold standard, once account is taken of fiscal and monetary conditions.9 Faced with higher
interest rates, countries with a poor record of adherence to gold felt the incentive to put their
house in order. In other words, the gold standard acted as a ‘good housekeeping seal of
approval’.
The market mechanism is undoubtedly an important part of any comprehensive picture
of the gold standard, but its implications for EMU must be considered carefully. It is not only
membership of a given club (the gold standard then, EMU tomorrow) that markets monitor,
but more broadly the credibility of policies which in turn permit the participation in that club to
be maintained. This distinction matters a lot for EMU because a strict interpretation of Bordo
and Rockoff’s results could be that, once countries commit to a permanently fixed exchange
rate,  the seal of approval  mechanism is lost. Yet there are grounds to believe that markets will
discriminate among EMU member governments – as opposed to countries – paying particular
attention to fiscal policies.
In this section, consistent with modern analyses of market discipline (e.g., Bishop et al.,
1989), we focus on the pricing of government bonds. Three possible patterns are tried, as
explained formally in Box 1. The first pattern may be interpreted as the weak form of the
market discipline hypothesis. It posits a linear relationship between risk premia (measured by
the spread between the country’s long-term interest rate and a (risk-free) British consol) and
debt levels (measured by debt/GDP ratios). This specification assumes that increased
indebtedness is costly, but that the marginal cost of increased indebtedness is constant. Supply-
side incentives for fiscal orthodoxy do not change as debt accumulates. We will refer to this
weak version of the market discipline hypothesis as the ‘linear form’.
                                         
9 The sample used by Bordo and Rockoff only partly overlaps with ours.
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We consider two additional specifications. Both assume that the relation between debt
levels and interest rates is non-linear: more specifically, that the marginal cost of borrowing
increases with the debt level. The ‘credit punishing’ specification – the strong form of the
market discipline hypothesis – posits that borrowing costs grow exponentially with the debt
level. This specification assumes that debt accumulation increases the probability of default. In
contrast to the linear form, the growth of the marginal cost of borrowing creates a growing
disincentive for debt over-accumulation. Finally, the ‘ugly’ form of the market discipline
hypothesis considers that there exists a debt threshold beyond which the sovereign is no longer
able to borrow because lenders react to the risk of default by rationing borrowers (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981). Technically, the credit supply schedule has an asymptote (an infinite limit) at the
level of indebtedness where rationing occurs. We refer to this last version of the market
discipline hypothesis as ‘credit rationing’.10 Clearly the linear mechanism provides weaker
incentives to borrowers than the punishing or rationing ones for high debt levels.
4.2. Estimation results
We use our panel of European countries to examine the link between indebtedness and the cost
of borrowing by regressing the spreads of government bond yields over a risk-free bond on the
debt/GDP ratios. Our regressions also capture the effect of economic fundamentals that may
influence debt sustainability. These include the exports/GDP ratio and levels of economic
development measured by using real GDP per head converted at PPP prices. We also included
an ‘on gold’ variable, which takes the value 1 when the country is on gold in any given year,
                                         
10 This latter form of the market discipline hypothesis was applied to US states by Bayoumi et al. (1993). The r
findings imply that American states are rationed at relatively low debt ratios, all below 10% of gross state
product. These thresholds are far below what was observed under the gold standard, and far below current
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and zero otherwise.11 This variable may be interpreted as either capturing the additional effect
of market discipline in rewarding countries adhering to gold (the seal of approval view) or
reflecting a number of factors that were known to market participants, but which are not
included in our data set and which were correlated with adherence to the gold standard (e.g.,
political shocks).
The results of pooled regressions are shown in Table 6. We use instrumental variables
(see Appendix B for details) with explanatory variables alternatively included in and excluded
from the estimation. The results range from the most parsimonious specifications (only debt
ratios are included) to the most extensive ones (all exogenous variables are included). In all
regressions, the parameters are generally found statistically significant and their signs
correspond to economic intuition. The negative effect of per capita income reflects the fact that
economic development is typically accompanied by a greater ability to tax, and hence improved
debt sustainability. The negative effect of openness captures the fact that in nineteenth-century
Europe, capital exporting countries were also the most open ones. Open countries were usually
capital lenders and had a greater ability to retain foreign investment; hence they were better
able to deal with external payment problems (Bairoch, 1974). The signs of the debt and ‘on
gold’ variables clearly fit the previous discussions.
Judging from the fit (adjusted R2), the non-linear specifications (panels a and c) do a
better job than the linear specification (panel b). This conclusion can be rigorously tested when
comparing the ‘rationing’ and ‘linear’ specifications, since the latter can be seen as imposing on
the former the restriction that the ‘debt rationing’ coefficient is zero. This restriction is clearly
rejected. Additional tests presented in Appendix B do not discriminate clearly between the two
                                                                                                                          
European debt levels. This suggests that the overall economic and institutional context in which US states
accumulate debts is quite different from the European one, past, present and future.
11  We favour the latter interpretation. Indeed our model, contrary to Bordo and Rockoff’s, shows a very good
performance of all structural variables. For instance, debt levels matter a lot in our regression, while in their
work, fiscal and monetary variables turned out to be non-significant. In Bordo and Rockoff, only dummies and
quasi-dummies bore the brunt of the explanatory power. This suggests that more work should be done before
we can make sure that this « seal of approval » mechanism had an independent action.
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non-linear specifications. In fact, for our current purpose, it is enough to observe that both
specifications point to similar conclusions. The rationing hypothesis suggests precise but very
high rationing thresholds. This means that rationing, even if it took place, occurred at such
high debt levels that the difference between the ‘punishing’ and ‘rationing’ views is a matter
more of taste than of substance.
In order to study the robustness of our results, we performed a full series of tests reported in
Appendix B. These include tests for pooling, tests of coefficient stability allowing for country-
specific effects, excluding problem countries (e.g., Greece and Portugal), tests of sub-sample
stability over the two periods identified in the paper (before and after 1895) as well as checking
for the validity of our instruments.
The conclusion that emerges from the previous statistical exercises is that the gold
standard experience by and large supports the view that markets react to increases in debt
burdens by inflicting increasingly higher risk premia. On the other hand, countries had to
plunge quite deep into debt before they started feeling the pain. This can be illustrated by the
fact that long-term interest rates converged after 1900, while debt levels remained as high as
100% of GDP in some countries, implying that at this level, markets did not inflict massive
punishments. That debt burdens seriously mattered only when they reached fairly high levels
suggests that the market mechanism, while certainly a strong incentive, did not provide
absolute discipline. The same market mechanism was in fact in place both during the period of
rising public debts and at the time of steady decline during the Belle Epoque. Clearly some
other factor must have driven the flow and ebb of European public debts.
5. CONVERGENCE BY OTHER MEANS: LOST RECIPES FROM THE GOLD
STANDARD
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In this section, we argue that price movements constitute a key factor in the behaviour of debts
ratios. In the late nineteenth century, price trends went through two subperiods which
interestingly coincide with the evolution of public debts. Prices moved down between 1873 and
1896, and then up until the war – a tendency perceptible in all countries adhering to gold, in
Europe and elsewhere. There is general agreement that these trends can be explained by the
supply of gold. Gold was too scarce to avoid deflation in the wake of the decline in the
monetary role of silver after 1873, but it suddenly became abundant following discoveries in
South Africa and Klondike in the 1890s. While it obviously matters how central banks reacted,
for our purpose it is enough to assume that they were essentially passive as they stuck to gold.
Indeed, Barsky and De Long (1991) show that gold output was a good predictor of inflation in
gold standard countries, implying that central banks in the gold zone did not fully sterilize the
effects of gold discoveries.
The considerable degree of covariation of price levels across gold standard countries is
abundantly documented. For instance, McCloskey and Zecher (1984) even argue that the
observed price correlation was responsible for the smooth operation of the gold standard:
countries on gold were like the ‘regions’ of a single area. Having shown, however, that the
gold standard did not operate particularly smoothly in Europe, we need to revisit the role of
price fluctuations. Price dynamics could generate pleasant or unpleasant fiscal arithmetics,
depending on whether prices were moving up or down. A fall in the general price level meant,
other things being equal, rising levels of debt ratios. With constant GDP and tax revenues,
falling prices meant an increase in the burden of interest service on outstanding long-term debt.
In contrast, a rise in prices would reduce the burden of the outstanding nominal debt. In other
words, governments were collecting an inflation tax when prices were steadily rising, and
paying a deflation premium when prices were steadily falling.
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To illustrate the mechanism at work, we decompose the dynamics of the debt/GDP
ratio into its components: the ratio of primary deficits to GDP (that is, the deficit before
interest service is taken into account), the ex-post real interest service and, finally, real GDP
growth. Higher real interest service or higher primary deficits contribute to raising the debt
burden, whereas higher growth contributes to reducing it.12 Figure 5 describes the evolution of
these three components for the set of countries for which data on public debt service were
available. Several features emerge. First, primary deficits did not change dramatically at the
turn of the century. Indeed, the five-year averages that we report indicate that, for a number of
countries, there was a deterioration rather than an improvement. Debt reduction must have
come from somewhere else. This is especially visible for peripheral countries such as Austria-
Hungary, Italy and Russia, where debt ratios went down by substantial amounts. The
improvement in debt ratios can be traced back to a combination of drastic declines in real
interest service and an acceleration of growth. Real interest service fell from rather high levels
in the early 1880s to record lows after 1905: they went from 8% to 1% in Italy, from 5% to
3% in Austria, from 6.5% to 1.5% in Germany, etc. Even without the contribution of improved
growth prospects,  as inflation progressed , public debt sustainability improved, and the default
risks that sovereign borrowers faced declined. The acceleration of growth that some countries
experienced at the turn of the century helped further. However, this tendency was perhaps less
systematic than the effects of gold inflation. For instance, growth was marked in Austria,
Russia and Germany, but much less so in Britain and France.
This mechanism was amplified by the predominance of the long-term component in
European sovereign debts: the inertia of the interest service on this fraction of public debts was
                                         
12 Let b(t) = B(t)/GDP(t), be the ratio of nominal debt B to nominal GDP, r(t) the real (ex-post) interest rate,
g(t) the real growth rate, and def(t) the primary deficit divided by GDP. Then the total deficit, or accumulation
of debt is: db(t) = def(t) + (r(t) – g(t))b(t).
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the channel through which price movements affected public finances.13 Through their effect on
public finances, price trends in turn influenced governments’ incentives to participate in the
gold standard. Deflation forced a difficult choice between deteriorating borrowing conditions
and painful adjustments. Countries starting with relatively low debt levels could compromise,
letting their debt drift slightly and making only partial fiscal adjustments. But for those that
already had fairly high debt levels, such as the southern European countries, the adjustment
cost required for continued participation in the gold standard could be very large, especially
since the market mechanism implied that a sustained deterioration in public debts meant
accelerating premia for new loans. The opportunity cost of being part of the gold standard was
becoming very substantial, increasing the pressure to switch to seigniorage finance, and go on
inconvertible paper to escape gold deflation. On the other hand, when prices rose, countries
were suddenly able to reduce the cost of new loans (as debt levels decreased), while facing a
lower real cost of interest service on existing indebtedness. Thus inflation provided an
additional reason for participating in the gold club.
Summarizing,  price trends, of which no single country had control, strongly affected
incentives to belong to the gold club. Indeed, club membership followed the trends: deflation
until the mid-1890s, inflation afterwards. Moreover, in periods of deflation, as public finances
tend to deteriorate, the price of central bank independence rises. Central bank independence
did not survive in the most heavily indebted and economically vulnerable countries. Markets
were trapped when falling prices pushed the highly indebted countries to breaking point. Under
these circumstances, market discipline and central bank independence could only be self-
defeating. By contrast, after the mid-1890s, governments could both better listen to the
markets’ wishes and reduce default risk. The second factor facilitating consolidation of the
                                         
13  We do not have a precise breakdown of the proportion of short- and long-term debts for all countries in the
sample. Various indications suggest that long-term ‘funded’ debt represented more than 90% of the aggregate
public debt in countries like Britain, Germany and France, and even Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
It fell to lower levels (still above 50%) in other peripheral countries.
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gold standard after the mid-1890s was improved growth in a number of countries (most
notably members of the periphery) at the turn of the century. Of course, it is likely that inflation
and growth trends were related, since the decline in long-term real interest rates facilitated
investment and growth. With growth rates rising above interest rates, debt burdens receded,
bringing about the golden age of the European gold standard.
6. CONCLUSION
Economists have long scrutinized the gold standard sphinx, trying to understand its riddle in
the hope of discovering lessons that could help bring back the golden age. In fact, the gold
standard heyday was a rather limited period, extending from the late 1890s or early 1900s to
the First World War, not the whole 1880–1913 era, as is often believed. This evolution, so far
little noticed, conveys several interesting lessons. First market-imposed discipline was a very
important aspect of the gold standard and will certainly matter under EMU. However, it
cannot be relied upon exclusively to provide borrowers with appropriate incentives. Incentives
even become destabilizing when unexpected deflation adversely affects public finances. This
lesson supports formal limitations on debts or deficits. On the other hand, debt ratios above
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60% are not a hindrance provided that they are on a declining trend. The European gold
standard could survive with high and varied debt levels, but its consolidation coincided with a
period of general decline in debt ratios.
The second lesson for EMU is that denying admission into the Euro zone may not be
the best way to solve the syst mic risk of debt over-accumulation. Externalizing that risk may
create other problems. Left to themselves and to the imperfect discipline of financial markets in
the early 1890s, southern European countries borrowed too much and were found high and dry
when the cost of borrowing surged. Exchange depreciation in the periphery in turn created
protectionist pressures in those countries of the European core which still had a large
agricultural sector, such as France. This is a clear reminder that the benefits of externalizing
fiscal discipline by limiting the Euro zone to a small number of countries must be balanced
against the costs of endangering the single market.
Our third lesson concerns the successful record of eastern and central European
peripheries. Even under the most lenient application of optimum currency area crite ia, these
relatively backward countries would not have qualified for gold area membership. Yet the
exceptional growth that Russia and Austria-Hungary experienced after 1900 suggests that
continued adherence to the gold standard provided them with all the benefits of low interest
rates, including declining debts and better growth prospects. It might well be that, by the same
mechanism, some countries of the current European periphery will be among the big winners
of EMU.
Finally, our analysis highlights the importance of finding a proper balance between
discipline and incentives. The gold standard turned out to be hostage to the exogenous
evolution of prices. Over the period 1873–96, the declining price trend exacerbated the public
finance problems of the periphery to breaking point. After 1896,  by contrast, inflation made
convergence and steady participation in the gold zone much more attractive. Governments
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became more eager to conform to the discipline that markets required. The clear implication
for EMU is that its stability will hinge on the ECB’s policy not being too restrictive.
In the end, the heyday of the European gold standard was an accident of history. It
came about when steady gold inflation moderated national incentives to extract seigniorage
and brought about a reduction of debt burdens that contributed to lower interest rates. This in
turn facilitated growth and the convergence process. Exchange stabilization and the spread of
central bank independence followed. To what extent could such a regime survive? The whole
construct was quite dependent upon features such as price trends that in a gold standard would
have to be reversed over the long run. It was not very well equipped to face the major shock
that the war and its aftermath represented. The bad and good fortunes of the gold standard
should, in fact, serve as a reminder that we all are accidents of history.
Table 1.  The Extension of the Franchise:
Registered population as a % of the eligible age group
1880 1890 1900 1910 1913
United Kingdom 35,8 62,4 61,5 62,2 62,4
France 86,4 86,6 90 91,5 90,5
Germany 91,3 92,3 94,2 94 86,8
Belgium 8,2 8,1 90,7 91,6 91,6
Netherlands 12,2 25,6 51,6 62,6 67
Switzerland 79,2 80,2 78,1 76,4 75,8
Denmark 78,3 84,2 85,4 87,9 87,8
Norway 23,7 32,2 89,7 95 95
Sweden 23,5 22,9 27,5 77,5 76,5
Italy 9 32 26,5 32,2 89,8
Spain na na na na na
Portugal na na na na na
Greece na na na na na
Austria-Hungary 24,8 30,5 34,3 94,5 94,5
Russia na na na na na
Source: Flora et al. [1983], vol I, pp. 89 ff.
36
37
Table 2. Central Bank Independence: Core Countries.
Great-Britain
Bank of England
France
Banque de France
Germany
Reichsbank
Status: Private Private Private
Head:
Appointed by:
Governor and 1 deputy
governor
Shareholders
Gouverneur & 2 sous
gouverneurs
Government
President
Imperial Government
Council:
Appointed by:
24 Directors
Shareholders
Régents
Shareholders
4 curators, the Chancellor, and
three delegates
1 curator appointed by the
Chancellor, the others by the
Federal Council.
3 delegates appointed by the
shareholders participate to
board meetings (no vote)
 Cover system: Act of 1844: 100% specie
backing in the issue department,
plus fixed issues on "securities".
Suspension of the act of 1844
required to issue beyong this
limit
No formal rule (limits on
aggregate issues are regularly
r vised upwards)
* Fixed limit against which
reserve of 1/3 must be held.
Remaining 2/3 to be issued on
the basis of first class bills.
* issues beyond this figure must
have 100% cash backing
*Penalties beyond
Parallel issues: No No No
Statutory advances:Yes
But very limited: "deficiency
advances" in the Banking
department under Parliament.
control
No obligation Possible (discount of
government bills)
Issues on govt sec:Upper limit No obligation Possible
StateÕs treasurer: Yes Yes, partly Yes, (for free since 1909)
Profits: Shared Rent to the state Shared
Monopoly: Yes (quasi-monopoly) Yes (since 1848) Yes (quasi-monopoly since
1876, reinforced in 1899)
Charter/revised: 1833/1844 1857/1897 1875/1889/1899/1909
Legal tender: Acto of 1844 Since 1870 Not until 1909
Source: Lévy [1911], Conant [1915]
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Table 3. Central Bank Independence: Small Countries
Netherlands: de Nederlandsche
Bank
Sweden:
Riksbank
Norway
Norgesbank
Denmark
Nationalbanken
Belgium
Banque Nationale de
Belgique
Status Private Government owned Private, but State is large
Shareholder
Private Private
Head:
Appointed by:
President (7 years)
Government
Commission that is not
responsible to the executive
govt,
President and vice president
Government
5 members in board of
directors
1 by govt, 5 by shareholders
Governor
(5 years)
Government
Council:
Appointed by:
5 regents
Shareholders
and controlled by the Diet5 members
Shareholders
15 members
Co-opted
6 Directeurs
Shareholders
Cover System Reserve>40% of circul Reserve>40 millions Krona35 million Krona unbacked
issue
Reserve>50% issue Reserve
(=specie+bills)>33% of
issues)
Parrallel issue: NO NO NO NO NO
Statututory Advances:Yes, but very
limited
NO NO Yes, but ceiling NO
Statutory issues on
govt sec.:
Limited to a fraction of the
reserve and capital
Yes, but limited
3/8th of the 40 million
reserve
NO Yes but very limited Yes, but very limited (<50
millions)
State's Treasurer: Yes NO Yes Yes (state’s cashier office)Yes
Profits: Yes: profits in excess of
dividends
Yes: All profits
(State bank)
Yes: profits in excess of
dividends+
retained
earnings
Yes fixed duty + profits in
excess of dividends
Yes : profits in excess of
dividents
Monopoly Yes Yes, since 1904 Yes, if convertibility
maintained
Yes since 1818 Yes since 1850
Chart/revised 1863/1889/1903 1887/1897/1904 1816/1900 1818/1907 1850-1872-1900
Legal tender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, since 1873
Source: Lévy [1911], Conant [1915], and for Denmark, private communication to the authors
by Ingrid Henriksen and Hans Chr. Johansen.
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Table 4. Central Bank Independence:
Central and Eastern Europe
Russia
Bank of Russia
Before 1894
Russia
Bank of Russia
After 1894
Austria-Hungary
Oesterreischich-
Ungarischen Bank
Before 1892
Austria-Hungary
Oesterreischich-
Ungarischen Bank
After 1892
Status State State Private Private
Head:
Appointed by:
Governor
Imperial government
Governor
Imperial government
Governor and 2 deputy
governors
Jointly appointed
Governor and 2 deputy
governors
Jointly appointed
Council:
Appointed by:
Board of civil servantsBoard of civil servantsCouncil General (12
members
Shareholders
Council General (12
members
Shareholders
Cover System None 1894: limit on issues
1887 without gold
backing
1897: 50% gold
backing for issues under
600 millions ruble,
100% cover beyond this
point
200 milllion florind
unbacked issues
Reserves>40%
circulation
400 million Crowns
unbacked issues
Reserves (1900)
Parrallel issue: Yes, unlimited No Yes No
Statututory Advances:Yes, unlimited No Yes, since 1873
overdraft to both Austria
and Hungary
Very limited
Statutory issues on govt
sec.:
Yes, but limited Yes, but limited Yes No
State's Treasurer: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Profits: 100% go to the state 100% go to the state Shared Shared
Monopoly Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chart/revised (statutes)
1860/1894/1897
(statutes)
1860/1894/1897
1878/87/97/1907 1878/87/97/1907
Legal tender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Lévy [1911], Conant [1915].
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Table 5. Central Banks Independence: Southern Europe
Portugal
Banco de Portugal
Greece
National Bank of Greece
Spain
Banca d’Espana
Italy
Banca Nazionale/
Banca d'Italia
Status Private Private Private Private
Head:
Appointed by:
Governor, vice-governor,
Government (Governor  3
years), vice-governor from
list supplied by directors
Governor, 2 sub-governors
and one commisaire royal
Elected by shareholders'
general assembly
Governor
Government
Direttore Generale
Shareholders with
government
approval
Council:
Appointed by:
10 directors
Shareholders
Administrators
Shareholders
Board
Shareholders
Board
Shareholders
Cover System Reserve ratios rules
Dismantled in the late
1880s and early 1890s,
never reimposed
1877: limits on note issues
1885: 1/3 of issues backed
by gold
1874: specie=1/4 note issue
and note issue and max
issue=750 millions of ptas
1891: reserve>1/3 note
issue, gold > 1/2 reserve,
and max issue=1500
millions ptas
1898: max issue= 2500
mions ptas
*1874-1884: under the
Consorzio limits on the
circulation of each bank of
issue.
*1891: each bank's max
issue is raised
*1893: gold and foreign
bills>40% note issue
* After 1897 Reserve must
be >300 then 400 millon
lira
Parrallel issue: No No No No
Advances: * limit of 2000 contos until
1887
* Since 1887: ceiling
renegotiated every year
*In 1885; government
credit in exchange for larger
note issues
*Existing advances
converted into government
securities in 1898
Yes:
* whole period ; up to
125000000 ptas (law of
1874)
*1890s credit by
discounting ultramar's
pagares
*1891-1893: extra credit of
150 mlns ptas
*1902: advances (except for
the 150 millions ptas credit)
must be reimbursed by 1911
Yes
*1874-1884
Advances from Consorzio
against government
securities (up to 1 billion
lira)
*1884-1893: advances of
banks of issue against
deposit of government
securities
* After 1893: Limited.
Advances up to 115 million
lira.only
Issues on govt sec.: * Limited until 1887.
Yes, since 1887
* 1/3 of note issues
according to law of 1885.
* Short term debt
consolidated in 1898 must
be amortized
Yes: no limit *Before 1893: yes: banks
can take government bonds
in portfolio
*After 1893, yes but not
beyond 75 millions.
State's Treasurer: Yes Yes, some treasurer roleYes Yes (increased
responsibilities across time)
Profits: Shared Shared until 1892 Nothing goes to the stateOnly tax on circulation
Monopoly July 8, 1891 Quasi Monopoly in 1899 1874 *Quasi-monopoly in 1893
Chart/revised 1846/1887 1841/1866/1903 1856/1874/1899 1893
Legal tender 1887-1891: 5km around the
bank
1891: Portugal
Yes (1885) Yes (1874) Yes (1893)
Source: Lévy [1911], Conant [1915], and private communication to the authors by Olga
Christodoulakis (Greece) and Jaime Reis (Portugal).
Table 6. Assessing the market mechanism.
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Table 6.a : "Rationing" (Pooling) : Equation (3).
a b1 b2 On Gold g implied
threshold
R2
adj.
Hausman
test
Sargan
test
SBIC
1 1.732
(3.06)
-0.958
(-0.98)
-1.627
(-2.39)
-0.528
(-3.22)
0.356
(10.18)
281% 0.67 c2(3)=89.26
(P=0.00)
c2(1)=0.01
(P=0.92)
708.1
2 1.949
(3.18)
-0.041
(-0.04)
-2.052
(-2.81)
— 0.343
(9.47)
292% 0.66 c2(2)=61.54
(P=0.00)
c2(1)=0.03
(P=0.87)
710.2
3 2.037
(3.15)
-0.886
(-1.01)
— — 0.338
(9.32)
296% 0.65 c2(2)=9.19
(P=0.01)
c2(2)=0.25
(P=0.88)
712.6
4 1.949
(3.17)
— -2.054
(-2.92)
— 0.343
(9.52)
292% 0.66 c2(2)=25.58
(P=0.00)
c2(2)=0.01
(P=0.99)
707.2
5 2.044
(3.07)
— — — 0.335
(9.27)
299% 0.65 c2(2)=18.90
(P=0.00)
c2(3)=0.45
(P=0.93)
709.7
Table 6.b : "Linear" (Pooling) : Equation (4)
a b1 b2 On Gold R2 adj. Hausman
test
Sargan
test
SBIC
1 5.645
(4.69)
3.838
(2.94)
-1.708
(-2.36)
-0.398
(-1.36)
0.62 c2(2)=12.40
(P=0.00)
c2(1)=0.02
(P=0.90)
735.6
2 5.877
(5.27)
4.287
(3.36)
-1.929
(-2.42)
— 0.62 c2(2)=10.42
(P=0.01)
c2(1)=0.01
(P=0.91)
733.8
3 6.315
(6.24)
3.326
(2.69)
— — 0.61 c2(1)=6.83
(P=0.01)
c2(2)=0.13
(P=0.93)
733.7
4 5.768
(5.15)
— -1.569
(-2.00)
— 0.61 c2(2)=9.12
(P=0.01)
c2(2)=0.13
(P=0.94)
733.2
5 6.160
(6.16)
— — — 0.61 c2(1)=2.19
(P=0.14)
c2(3)=0.06
(P=0.99)
732.3
Table 6.c : "Punishing" (Pooling) : Equation (2)
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a b1 b2 On Gold R2 adj. Hausman
test
Sargan
test
SBIC
1 1.449
(6.28)
-16.426
(-3.43)
-3.213
(-5.08)
-0.345
(-3.39)
0.81 c2(1)=20.19
(P=0.00)
c2(1)=0.03
(P=0.87)
595.5
2 1.490
(6.32)
-15.451
(-3.03)
-3.652
(-6.43)
— 0.80 c2(2)=15.08
(P=0.00)
c2(1)=0.01
(P=0.91)
601.0
3 2.025
(7.75)
-10.06
(-2.66)
— — 0.72 c2(1)=12.05
(P=0.00)
c2(2)=0.48
(P=0.79)
665.8
4 1.471
(5.91)
— -3.476
(-5.74)
— 0.79 c2(3)=31.90
(P=0.00)
c2(2)=0.35
(P=0.84)
610.6
5 2.041
(7.36)
-1.457
(-5.89)
— — 0.72 c2(3)=7.93
(P=0.05)
c2(3)=1.14
(P=0.77)
666.7
Notes: Number of observations : 398. Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent Student t's
(corresponding standard errors are computed from heteroscedastic-consistent matrix (White)).
Note: Frequently in practice, some elements of the difference in the covariance matrices of the two sets of
estimates are negative on the diagonal. If this is the case, the Hausman test should be computed only for those
parameters corresponding to positive diagonal elements, with a corresponding correction to the degrees of
freedom, which is what our program does. (One has to use a generalized inverse in the many cases in which the
covariance matrix of the vector of contrasts does not have full rank. See Hausman and Taylor (1982)).
Note: The above tables report the results for instrumented regressions. The instruments used were a constant
term, a time trend, the rate of growth of the country's population, the first lag of the debt to GDP ratio for each
country, and the burden of interest service for each country (IR/Rev where Rev is government revenue and IR is
interest payment on the public debt). Regressions involving different sets of instruments are reported in the
annex.
Source: Authors’ computations (see text for methodology).
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Box 1: The linear, punishing and rationing models.
Consider the following arbitrage relation, which states that for a risk neutral investor,
the expected return for a risky bond must equal the expected return for a risk free bond,
say a British Consol (sit  represents the risk premium charged on currency i at date t):
(1 + RUKt + sit ) · P(Ht ) + 0 · (1 - P(Ht )) = 1 + RUKt (1)
Where Rit=Rukt+sit stands for interest rate charged to country i at date t (sit is the
default premium, P(Hit) is the probability of default, P’(Hit)<0, and Hit is a variable
summarizing the determinants of default (we abstract from taxation as a large proportion
of the bonds studied here were exempt from tax duties). Getting rid of the country and
time indices, assuming that P(H) is a logistic function (P(H) =1/(1+exp(H))), and writing
H=aB/GDP+X’b  (where B/GDP is the debt/GDP ratio and X is a vector of exogenous
variables influencing the probability of default), we get the following model:
s
B
GDP
EX
GDP
GDP
POP
= + + +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷ +expa b b b e0 1 2 (2)
Which is non-linear: we call this expression the « credit punishing » equation, where
EX/GDP is the exports to GDP ratio, and GDP/POP is real GDP per head converted at
PPP prices. In this formulation, the default premium grows exponentially with the debt
level, but there is no absolute limit to borrowing.
Another formulation is to model the default premium as an increasing function of
B/GDP, but with an upper limit on debt accumulation. This can be done if one assumes
that the whole debt is reimbursed and reissued at every period (see Bayoumi et al.
[1995]). This allows to identify the marginal cost of borrowing (Ri) with the average cost
of servicing the total debt (the interest burden on the outstanding debt). In this case, the
formula assumes that the derivative of the cost of borrowing with respect to the
debt/GDP ratio converges towards infinity when the debt GDP ratio approaches a certain
threshold (equal to 1/g). Formally:
s
B
GDP
EX
GDP
GDP
POP B
GDP
= + + +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷ ·
-
+a b b b
g
e0 1 2
1
1
(3)
We call this equation the « cr dit-rationing hypothesis », a  it shows that the default
premium rises to infinity when the debt GDP ratio approaches 1/g: borrowers are
prevented from increasing their debt beyond 1/g. These two formulations are to be
contrasted with an alternative linear relation between the default premium and the debt to
GDP ratio. Formally:
s
B
GDP
EX
GDP
GDP
POP
= + + + +a b b b e0 1 2 (4)
Which is referred to in the text as the linear form of the market discipline hypothesis.
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APPENDIX A. DATA
We rely on a combination of second-hand sources as well as primary material that we
collected, covering the period 1880–1913.
A1. Public debts and interest service
Researchers working on nineteenth-century public finance typically rely on published
sources uch as Mitchell (1993) and Liesner (1989). Before the creation of the League of
Nations in the interwar period, no centralized statistical office existed, so that researchers have
to centralize data themselves, putting together national figures: this is the approach followed
by Mitchell. The problem is that Mitchell’s fiscal figures (which are very imperfect in many
respects) do not include public debts. On the other hand, reliable second-hand national data on
public debts exist for only a few countries, including Mitchell (1990) for Britain, Gerloff
(1912) for Germany, Zamagni (1997) for Italy, and Pirard (1978) for Belgium. To complete
our database we used the returns of Macmillan’s Statesman’s Year Book, as well as the
publications of the Société Internationale de Statistique, which brought together some of the
most famous statisticians of the time. Neymarck (1913) contains some interesting
complementary information. Finally, we used the archives of the Crédit Lyonnais, which before
the First World War had a research department that was very active and appropriately staffed.
These sources helped fill the holes in existing sources for both debt figures and interest service.
Debt returns are all inclusive: that is, they take into account the short-term floating debt as well
as the long-term funded ebt, the domestic paper debt, as well as the xternal gold debt,
evaluated in nominal terms and converted into the national unit.
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A2. National product and prices
Recently, substantial efforts have been devoted to extending our knowledge of European
accounts well beyond pioneering works on core c untries. We were able to obtain reliable data
for virtually every country in the sample. The references are as follows: Austria-Hungary:
Komlos (1987) and Schulze (1997); France: Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985);
Germany: Hoffmann et al. (1965); Greece: Kostelenos (1995) ; Spain: Prados de la Escosura
(1995); Portugal: Nunes et al. (1989) and Lains and Reis (1991); England: Mitchell (1990);
Russia: Gregory (1994); Netherlands: Smits et al. (1997); Sweden: Johansson (1967);
Denmark and Norway: Mitchell (1993). For Belgium and Switzerland, a series was
reconstructed on the basis of end-of period estimates as well as of indications for real GDP
growth given in Maddison (1991). Swiss prices are found in Ritzmann (1996).
A3. Exchange rates
The exchange rates used were constructed on the basis of Schneider et al. (1991), except for
Greece, for which we used a Lyonnais series. Data are annual averages.
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A4. Exports
We relied exclusively on Mitchell (1993), except for the Netherlands, for which the figures are
flawed. Dutch exports are from Smits et al. (1997).
A5. Population
Data in Mitchell (1993) completed by Gregory (1994) for Russia and by the Crédit Lyonnais
returns for the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
A6. Long-term interest rates
The classic source for long-term interest rates on government (gold) bonds is Homer and Sylla
(1991). However, the returns that these authors report cover only part of our sample. For
countries that are not documented in this source, and which typically include the continental
countries for which Paris was an essential financial centre (Portugal, Spain, Greece, Russia and
the Scandinavian countries for the latter part of the period under study), we used the Cours
Authentiques. Quarterly figures were collected, on the basis of which annual interest rates were
constructed. In order to select representative bonds, we used the information provided in the
Annuaire Officiel des Agents de Changes, which describes the various bonds listed. Data
availability as well as conversions, forced or not, required us in some cases to change our
reference bond, or to make some simple transformations when the coupon was changed (in all
cases, we checked that when they overlap, series for various bonds implied extremely close
returns, as arbitrage theory predicts).
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The series we use are gold consols: Austria (coupon: 4%); Denmark (1893 with a 3%
coupon); Sweden (4% of 1878,  3% bond of 1888, 3.5% of 1895); Norway (3.5% of 1886,
3% of 1888); Portugal (3% coupon, reduced in 1892 and 1902); Greece (5% of 1881, 5% of
1884 reduced in 1893); Russia (5% of 1877 until 1889, then 4% of  1880 until 1914);
Switzerland (3% of 1890, 3.5% of 1887 and 3% of 1897). For Spain, until 1882 we used the
3% ‘extérieure’,  replaced in 1882 by a 4% consol (Spanish residents faced a forced conversion
in 1898 into paper consols, but foreigners continued to get their coupon paid into gold). For
Italy we use the rendita 5%, converted to 3.5% in 1906. The sample covers 1880–1913, except
for Greece (1884–97 and 1905–13), Norway (1887–1913), Switzerland (1899–1912) and
Russia (1885–1912).
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS
B1. Specification tests
Various techniques were used to test the three specifications presented in panels (a), (b) and
performed a test of the ‘linear’ versus ‘punishing’ specifications, using a Box–Cox
transformation (Box and Cox, 1964) of the left-hand-side variables, which allows us to test a
  model versus a semi-log model. Again, the linear model was rejected.14
hand, the ‘punishing’ and ‘rationing’ specifications cannot be directly tested against each other,
since they are not nested. Instead we performed pseudo-nested tests based on the artificial
competing functions in a more general form in order to discriminate between them. MacKinnon
et al
pairs of J-tests and P-tests we computed (for each set of explanatory variables) were never able
to distinguish between the ‘rationing’ and the ‘punishing’ specifications, and could not reject
In another attempt to discriminate between the two non-linear models, we computed a
model selection test, known as the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria (SBIC), which has
alternatives being tested (see Geweke and Meese, 1981). We observe that in all cases the
                              
14 Pseudo-nested P-Tests also pointed to the same conclusion.
49
criteria favour the punishing specification. Again, we read this result as supportive of the idea
of a non-linear steep supply curve facing state borrowers, irrespective of the specific functional
form.
B2.  Sensitivity
In Table B1 we provide results for regressions that exclude problem countries in an attempt to
check for the stability of the coefficient. While removing Greece (a high-debt country) has the
mechanic effect of lowering estimated rationing levels, these remain very high (180%). In
Table B2, we report the results of regressions that allow for random effects (linear and
punishing equations). As can be seen, parameter estimates are robust to the introduction of
random effects.
B3. Instruments
To decide wether it is necessary to use instrumental variables, we first perform a Hausman–Wu
specification test (Hausman, 1978) reported in Table 6 for each regression. The test generally
rejects the equality of the two sets of estimated coefficients (instrumental variables versus non-
linear least squares), indicating the need to use instrument variables techniques (Davidson and
MacKinnon (1993) indicate how this test is applicable to non-linear models). Second, we test
for the adequacy of our instruments by regressing the appropriate independant variables on our
instruments set. In all three cases, an F-test rejects the hypothesis that the instruments are
jointly insignificant (results not reported). Third, we test the validity of our choice of
instruments using a Sargan test (Sargan, 1958; Mátyás and Sevestre (1996) consider the use of
the Sargan test in the context of panel data econometrics, and Davidson and MacKinnon
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(1993) show the analogue of the test for non-linear models). The success of the test (see Table
6) implies that all of the explanatory power of the instruments is being captured in the
independent variables. Finally, we have tried alternative subsets of instruments with the
rationing equation, again in order to assess parameter stability. Table B3 shows that the
parameter estimates and the implied rationing thresholds are stable.
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Table B1. Sensitivity to possible outliers : the cases of Greece and Portugal.
a g implied
threshold
R2
adj.
Portugal
1.647 0.357
(13.24)
0.74
Regression without 2.778
(7.82) (16.83)
180%
Note : We only report
(the linear and punishing specifications having yielded almost identical results as the general
regressions). Results when both countries were excluded are similar to the ones without
Table B2. Random effects
a 0 b b2 R2
Linear 4.744 -0.721
(-0.90) (0.62)
-0.742 -0.588
(-2.32)
Punishing 0.821 1.105
(4.28) (-2.47)
-1.998 -0.208
(-2.63)
Note :
specifications. Random effects in the rationing model involve specific techniques that would
require
Hausman Tests of FE versus RE showed FE for the above regressions, but RE for other
regressions with less explanatory variables. In all cases, F-tests choose FE versus
Table B3. Different sets of instruments
instruments used : b1 2 On g implied
d
R adj.
C,TIME,POP,IR/Rev
(0.48)
-0.295 -1.049
(-1.86) (-4.13)
0.395 253% 0.62
explanatory variables
1.681 -0.485
(-0.45) (-2.71)
-0.535 0.357
(8.75)
0.69
C,TIME,POP,B/GDP(-1)
(2.97)
-1.030 -1.311
(-2.54) (-3.30)
0.355 282% 0.67
1.751
(3.39) (-0.75)
-1.799 -0.534
(-3.22) (8.51)
294%
Source: Authors’ computations (see text for methodology).
 : The full set of possible instrument is : a constant term, a time trend, the rate of growth
of countries’ populations(POP), the burden of interest service for each country (IP/Rev), the
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